Volume 27

Issue 3

Article 11

1982

Federal Courts and Procedure
Various Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Various Editors, Federal Courts and Procedure, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 744 (1982).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss3/11

This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Editors: Federal Courts and Procedure

[VoL. 27: p. 744

Federal Courts and Procedure
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY

'As

SANCTIONS-

A SANCTION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A DISCOVERY ORDER,

A DISTRICT COURT HAS DISCRETION TO
SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS

.. FACT

RECOGNIZE
TO

AS ESTABLISHED

CONFER. IN

PERSONAM

JURISDICTION AND SATISFY DUE PROCESS.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of
North America (1981)
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea (CBG), a Delaware corporation, 1 engages in the mining and sale of bauxite solely in the nation of
Guinea.2

Through the Pittsburgh office of an insurance brokerage

firm,3 CBG purchased a-$20,000,000 business interruption policy to
insure against breakdowns at the CBG plant in Guinea.4 The Insurance Company of North America (INA) insured the first $10,000,000 of
loss 5 and a group of twenty-two foreign insurance companies (the excess
insurers) provided coverage for the remaining $10,000,000 6 through a
London broker..

CBG's bauxite crushing facility was damaged and the company
presented a claim for production losses in excess of $10,000,000,8 which
the insurers refused to pay.9 CBG then filed suit in the United States
1. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651
F.2d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1981). CBG was owned by Halco Mining, Inc. and the
Republic of Guinea. Id. at 880.
2. Id. CBG conducted no business in the United States and was not
registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Id.
3. Id. Halco Mining acted as CBG's agent and obtained coverage through
the Pittsburgh office of Marsh 8cMcLennan, an insurance brokerage firm. Id.
4. Id. The coverage was for profits lost during any decline in productivity
that resulted from damage to the CBG facilities. Brief for Appellee at 5,
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877
(3d Cir. 1981).
5. 651 F.2d at 880.
6. Id. For a list of the foreign insurance companies, see note 10 infra.
7. 651 F.2d at 880. As was customary in the London market, the broker's
lead underwriter circulated a "placing slip" among agents and representatives

of interested insurance companies which described the risks and total coverage

requested. Id. The representatives indicated the portion of coverage their
company would assume and initialed the slip. Id. Once the coverage was
fully subscribed, the broker in London briefly listed the risk and premium
details in a "cover note." Id. An actual policy was not issued at this point.
Id. Rather, the excess insurers adopted the form of the INA policy "as far as
applicable." Id., quoting App. at 136a, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981).
8. Brief for Appellee at 5, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981). A CBG tipplercrusher plant in Guinea was structurally damaged and the consequent decrease
in crushed bauxite production resulted in CBG's claimed loss of profits. Id.
9. 651 F.2d at 880.

(744)
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District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against all of its
insurers. 10 From 1976 to 1978, CBG made repeated requests and motions for document production in order to obtain the necessary facts
to establish in personam jurisdiction."
The excess insurers objected
to CBG's discovery requests as unduly burdensome and oppressive and
moved for dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. 12 In July,
1978, the district court ordered the production of certain documents
which would disclose the extent of the excess insurers' contacts with
Pennsylvania to facilitate the resolution of the jurisdictional issue."3
The excess insurers repeatedly failed to comply with the court's dis4
covery order.'
10. Id. Federal jurisdiction was asserted on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). 651 F.2d at 880. In addition to INA,
the defendants were: Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd.; Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd.;
Hanover Ins. Co.; Continental Assurance Co. of London, Ltd.; The Century
Ins. Co., Ltd.; Yuval, the Ins. Co. of Israel, Ltd.; Home Ins. Co., Ltd.;
Slater, Walker Ins. Co., Ltd.; Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd.;
Nichido Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.; Turegum Ins. Co.; Sahar Ins. Co.,
Ltd.; Excess Ins. Co., Ltd.; Trident Ins. Co., Ltd.; Vesta (UK) Ltd.; Chiyoda
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd., Tokyo; Stronghold Ins. Co., Ltd.; British Reserve
Ins. Co., Ltd.; English &cAm. Ins. Co., Ltd.; Consolidated European Reinsurance Co., Ltd.; and L'Union Atlantique S.A. D'Assurances Brussels. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 80-2416, slip
op. at 2 (3d Cir. June 10, 1981, as amended, June 16, 1981). One of the excess
insurers, Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co., Ltd., was dropped from the
case. Brief for the Appellant at 3 n.2, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981).
11. 651 F.2d at 881. Discovery began with a request on August 9, 1976
for production of all documents relating to the business interruption insurance policies issued by the excess insurers during the period 1972 to 1975.
Id. The insurers objected that compliance would be extremely expensive and
burdensome. Id. On May 12, 1977, CBG moved to compel production. Id.
The insurance companies interjected their claim that the district court did
not have personal jurisdiction over them but did not relate that claim to the
discovery order. Id.
12. Id. In a motion for summary judgment filed on May 20, 1977, 17
of the excess insurers sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
Four of the 21 insurers-Eagle Star Insurance Co., Ltd., Hanover Insurance
Co., Home Insurance Co., Ltd., and Turegum Insurance Co., Ltd.-conceded
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 880 n.2.
In opposing the insurers' motion for summary judgment, CBG, on July
14, 1978, renewed its request for document production, narrowing the scope
to encompass only policies with some logical relationship to Pennsylvania. Id.
at 882. The excess insurers objected that CBG's request would require "over
150 London brokers" to search through "hundreds of thousands of documents." Id., quoting App. at 517a, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981).
13. 651 F.2d at 877. On July 27, 1978, the district court found that CBG's
request was not burdensome and ordered the production, within ninety days,
of a list of names, policy numbers and a general outline of coverage on all
Pennsylvania related policies from "1971 to date." Id., quoting App. at 516a,
651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981). The excess insurers offered to make the documents, available in their home offices in London and Brussels in their motion
for summary judgment, but did not include the offer in the answering papers
in the discovery proceedings. 651 F.2d at 883-84.
14. 651 F.2d at 882. On October 25, 1978, the excess insurers, already in
violation of the district court's July order, requested and received an additional
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In March, 1979, the excess insurers brought an action in the High
Court of Justice in London to rescind their insurance contracts. 15
CBG then moved the district court to enjoin pursuit of the English
action.'0 The district court granted the injunction, finding that it had
personal jurisdiction over the excess insurers on two grounds.'1 First,
the court found evidence of sufficient minimum contacts to confer
jurisdiction under Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, and to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.' 8 Alternatively, the district
court took as established that it had personal jurisdiction as a sanction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) for the insurers'
failure to comply with the court's discovery order. 19
On appeal, 20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit l sustained the finding of personal jurisdiction, 22 holding that
80 days in which to comply with the order based on the insurers' representa,tions that discovery could "probably be completed within thirty days." Id.,
quoting App. at 309a, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981). On December 21, 1978,
the district court granted a final extension of 60 days, until February 21,
1979. 651 F.2d at 882. None of the requested documents had as yet been
produced. Id. In granting the final extension, the district court threatened
that a finding of personal jurisdiction would be imposed as a sanction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) if the defendants failed to produce
the documents. Id. Only a few of the requested documents had been produced at the close of the final extension period and the record indicated that
no meaningful attempt had been made to comply with the order until at least
two months after the representations that discovery could be completed within
30 days. Id.
For the pertinent text of Rule 37, see text accompanying note 28 infra.
For a general discussion of the Rule 37 sanction provisions, see notes 26-28
and accompanying text infra.
15. 651 F.2d at 880. The excess insurers alleged that CBG had failed
to disclose material facts relating to the subject matter of the coverage. Id.
16. Id. CBG argued that the British suit was filed to harass CBG and
that it raised issues identical to those in the case before the district court. Id.
17. Id. See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text infra.
18. Id., citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8301-8311 (Purdon 1972) (current
version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (Purdon 1981)). The Pennsylvania
statute confers jurisdiction on the courts of the Commonwealth over all persons
transacting business in Pennsylvania. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5322(a)(1)
(Purdon 1981). In addition, in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations is permitted "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of
the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this
Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." Id.
§ 5322(b).
19. 651 F.2d at 880.
20. The Insurance Company of North America was not a party to the

appeal. Id.
21. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Aldisert and
Gibbons. judge Aldisert wrote the majority opinion. Judge Gibbons dissented in part. The opinions were filed on June 10, 1981.
22. 651 F.2d at 885. On the principal question presented for review,
the Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the permanent injunction against pursuit of the British litigation, holding that the district court
lacked sufficient justification for "the breach of comity among the courts of
separate sovereignties" and had thus abused its discretion. Id. at 887. The
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in taking as established
the facts necessary for personal jurisdiction as a sanction for the insurers failure to comply with the court's discovery order. Compagnie

des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d
877 (3d Cir. 1981).
It is a fundamental principle of law that a court has jurisdiction in
the first instance to determine if it has jurisdiction. 23 As a corollary to
this authority a district court has the power to compel discovery on the
Third Circuit also reversed the imposition of the sanction finding in personam
jurisdiction over Chiyoda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.; Vesta (UK), Ltd.,
and L'Union Atlantique S.A. D'Assurances Brussels and directed dismissal of
the complaint with respect to them. Id. at 886. The court noted that since
the three companies had filed affidavits indicating that they had not associated with either CBG or the Pittsburgh broker, and had not issued policies
covering risks in Pennsylvania, they had complied with the district court's
discovery order. Id. In addition, the court concluded that the record revealed no evidence of minimum contacts that would otherwise justify the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction. Id.
Finally, the court dismissed the appellants' appeal of the district court's
order denying their motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.
Id. at 888. The court concluded that the denial was an inherently interlocutory order and not appealable. Id., citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1976).
23. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S.
266, 274 (1926); In re Trimble Co., 479 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1973). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any claim for relief "shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's
jurisdiction depends." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). If the allegations supporting
jurisdiction are challenged, the burden falls on the plaintiff to prove facts
necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v.
Jobar Int'l. Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Portland Para.
mount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967); DiCesare-Engler Prods., Inc.
v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703, 705 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
The exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation by
a federal court in diversity cases is governed by the law of the state in which
the district court sits. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223
(2d Cir. 1963). In Arrowsmith, the Second Circuit reviewed cases from eight
circuits and concluded:
There thus exists an overwhelming consensus that the amenability of
a foreign corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action
is determined in accordance with the law of the state where the
court sits, with "federal law" entering the picture only for the purpose of deciding whether a state's assertion of jurisdiction contravenes
a constitutional guarantee.
Id., citing Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541, 542 (3d Cir. 1953).
For further discussion of the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in diversity
cases, see generally 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 212 (1960); C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1113 (1st ed. 1973); C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64 (3d ed. 1977).
Historically, a state court's power to exercise in personam jurisdiction was
limited to persons found within its territorial boundaries or those voluntarily
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
733 (1878). Constitutionally permissible extension of state court jurisdiction
beyond the state's territorial limits was announced in the seminal case of
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The International
Shoe Court stated:
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jurisdiction issue. 24 It has been maintained that this power of necessity
25
includes the authority to sanction noncompliance.
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 37) provides
for the imposition of sanctions for the failure to comply with judicially
ordered discovery. 26 By its terms, Rule 37 gives a district court the dis27
cretion to impose such sanctions "as are just" for noncompliance.
Included among the enumerated sanctions available under Rule 37
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
Id., quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Subsequently, the
Court refined the minimum contacts analysis, stating: "[I]t is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and privileges of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958). The Court has held that one contact-the mailing of an offer to
insure into the forum state-was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements
in litigation by a resident to enforce the resulting contract. See McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957). However, the Court's
most recent decision on this question indicates that due process requires a
reasonable expectation that a defendant's conduct may result in being hauled
before a court in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
24. See Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968).
In Fraley, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing an action for lack of in personam jurisdiction and directed the court on remand
to order the defendant corporation to answer interrogatories concerning the
range and scope of its contacts with the forum state. Id. at 4. The Fraley

court reasoned that the range of the defendant's activities was critical to the
jurisdiction issue and held that the district court erred in refusing to direct

the defendant to respond to appropriate interrogatories. Id. at 3. See also
Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
For a discussion of Lekkas, see notes 43-48 and accompanying text infra.
25. See Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir.
1971) (per curiam). For a discussion of Lekkas, see notes 43-48 and accompanying text infra. See also English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723,
728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Grammenos v. Lemos, 457
F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972). For a discussion of English, see notes 38-42
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Lemos, see notes 49-53 and
accompanying text infra. But see Familia DeBoom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A.,
629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981) (declining to follow English and Lekkas). For a discussion of Familia DeBoom,
see notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). This rule provides a list of specific but not
exclusive sanctions which the court may impose. Id. These sanctions include:
taking facts sought to be discovered as established; refusing to allow the disobedient party to oppose or support designated claims or defenses; striking of
all or parts of the pleadings; dismissal of the action or entry of default judgment; treating the failure to comply as contempt of court, and requiring the
payment of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure
to comply with the discovery order. Id. For a history of the development
of Rule 37, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2281 (Ist ed. 1973). See generally 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure §§ 749-50
(1960); 4A. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 37.01 (2d ed. 1981).
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(b)(2)(A) is the power to find "that the matters regarding which the
order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order." 28
The United States Supreme Court has upheld discovery sanctions
under Rule 37 provided that the imposition of the sanction does not
violate a party's right to due process. 29 In Hammond Packing Co.
v. Arkansas,30 the Court upheld a default judgment imposed as a
sanction against a defendant who had refused to comply with a discovery order. 31 However, in Societe Internationale v. Rogers,32 the
Court made it clear that sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order

33
must not deny a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits.
The Rogers Court noted that "due process was found preserved in Hammond on the reasoning that the State simply utilized a permissible presumption that the refusal to produce material evidence . . . was but an

admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense."

34

28. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
29. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958), citing Hovey
v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S.
322 (1909). In Hovey, the lower court struck a defendant's answer and entered
a decree pro confesso for refusal to obey a court order in the suit. 167 U.S.
at 412. The Supreme Court found that due process had been denied. Id.
at 444.
30. 212 U.S. 322 (1909). Hammond involved an action brought by the
state for alleged price fixing in the sale of livestock. Id. at 334. Although
Rule 37 was not in force when Hammond was decided, the Supreme Court in
Rogers looked to Hammond and earlier decisions in determining the due
process limitations on the imposition of discovery sanctions. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 202 (1958).
31. 212 U.S. at 340. The Hammond Company was ordered to produce
documents relating to the merits of the action. Id. at 338. The company
challenged the authority of the court to enter the order on constitutional
grounds and refused to comply with it. Id. at 339.
32. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In Rogers, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to produce Swiss banking records as ordered by the court.
Id. at 203. The plaintiff claimed that the Swiss Penal Code prohibited disclosure of the records. Id. at 200. Although not all of the banking records
sought were produced, over 190,000 documents were eventually produced with
the consent of the Swiss Government and through waivers by other affected
parties. Id. at 203. A plan for examination of the remaining records by
an independent expert who would report to the parties and identify relevant
documents was rejected by the district court. Id.
33. Id. at 209.
34. Id. at 210, quoting Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. at
350-51. The Rogers Court noted further that the Hammond rationale might
not apply in circumstances where a party is unable to comply with the court's
order despite good faith efforts to do so. 357 U.S. at 210. The Court held
Rogers to be such a case and reversed the district court's dismissal of the
action. Id. at 212. The Court stated that "Rule 37 should not be construed
to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance
with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to
comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault of the petitioner." Id.
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In addition, the Supreme Court has noted that sanctions imposed
under Rule 37 are reversible only if the district court has abused its
discretion.85 In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc.,36 the Court stated: "The question, of course, is not whether this
Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter
have dismissed the action; it is whether the District Court abused its
discretion in so doing." 37
The circuit courts have not been of one mind concerning the
power of the district courts to take jurisdiction as established as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order. Recently, in the case
of English v. 21st Phoenix Corp.,3 s the Eighth Circuit upheld a Rule
37(b)(2)(A) sanction establishing personal jurisdiction. The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against a defendant who had
failed to comply with court ordered discovery.8 9 The district court's
order had been based, in part, on a sanction order taking as established
the fact that the defendant had sufficient contacts with Nebraska to confer jurisdiction on the court. 4 0 The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of
discretion or denial of due process in the use of a Rule 37 sanction to
35. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427
U.S. 639, 642 (per curiam), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976). Accord Laclede
Gas Co. v. G.W. Warnecke Corp., 604 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1979); Bonaventure
v. Butler, 593 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1979); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d
138 (1st Cir. 1977). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27,
§ 2284.
36. 427 U.S. 639 (per curiam), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976). The decision in National Hockey League upheld dismissal of an antitrust action as a
sanction under Rule 37 for the failure to give timely answers to interrogatories. 427 U.S. at 643. The interrogatories had gone unanswered for 17
months despite numerous extensions and notwithstanding admonitions by the
court. Id. at 640. The district court had, in addition, warned that further
failure could result in the imposition of Rule 37 sanctions. Id. at 641.
37. 427 U.S. at 642.
38. 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
39. 590 F.2d at 729. The English case involved an action brought in
the Nebraska district court against a New Jersey and a Delaware corpora.
tion for breach of a lease guarantee. Id. at 726. The defendants maintained
that only the New Jersey corporation, which had no assets, had guaranteed
the lease and that the New Jersey corporation had effectively confessed judgment. Id. at 728 n.4. Defendants obstructed the discovery of documents
which were sought to prove that the lease was guaranteed by the Delaware
corporation. Id. at 728. The defendants' "[f]ack of cooperation, inadequate
responses, and dilatoriness . . . hampered the orderly progression of discovery."
Id. at 726. The district court issued numerous orders to compel discovery and

granted the defendants extensions of time in which to comply. Id. at 726-27.

For a full chronology of the discovery in English, see id. at 727-28. The
district court imposed sanctions ordering that the matters which were the subject of the discovery were established. Id. at 727. On those facts, summary
judgment was granted on the liability issue. Id.
40. Id. at 728. In addition, the court imposed a sanction taking as an
established fact that the Delaware corporation was the guarantor of the lease.
Id. at 729.
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establish jurisdictional facts. 4 '

The English court reasoned that, unlike

subject matter jurisdiction, "in personam jurisdiction may be obtained
by actions of a party amounting to a waiver," thus warranting the exercise of the district court's discretion to find jurisdiction based on the
42
party's behavior.
Similarly, in Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia,43 the Fourth Circuit indicated that it would approve the application of a Rule 37 sanction which took as established jurisdictional facts. 44 The Lekkas court
vacated a district court's order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction 4"
and remanded the case for discovery on the jurisdiction issue.46 Noting
that the defendant's challenge to the district court's jurisdiction necessarily imposed "the obligation of furnishing on request all pertinent
41. Id. at 728. The Eighth Circuit summarized the proceedings in the
court below as follows:
Exercising itsdiscretion, it granted extensions of time for discovery,
held hearings on discovery motions, entered orders to compel discovery,
and finally, after the continued failure of appellants to respect discovery orders, it imposed a sanction drawn narrowly to establish as
admitted the fact that the Delaware corporation had contacts with
Nebraska sufficient to support in personam jurisdiction.
Id. The court also noted that the defendants' due process rights had not
been violated, stating: "In accord with the sound policy favoring the use of less
severe and harsh sanctions than dismissal or default, the District Court carefully tailored its order to address the specific information sought by discovery."
Id., citing Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977) (footnote
omitted).
In addition, the Eighth Circuit noted that the proceedings which led to
the imposition of the sanction finding the Delaware corporation the guarantor
of the lease were substantially similar. 590 F.2d at 728. Consequently, the
court found no abuse of discretion in the imposition of this sanction. Id. at
729.
42. 590 F.2d at 728 n.5, citing United States v. Gajewski, 419 F.2d 1088,
1091 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1040 (1970); 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE
4.02[3], at 4-48 (2d ed. 1978). The Eighth Circuit concluded that "[i]t is established beyond cavel that a court has jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction, and a party cannot hope to avoid the jurisdiction of a
court by concealing evidence regarding its activities in the forum state." 590
F.2d at 728 n.5.

43. 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. Im Lekkas, three Greek seamen brought a claim in admiralty

under the Jones Act for personal injuries which occurred on a vessel owned by
a Panamanian corporation and operated by an English corporation which had
an American corporate agent. Id. The district court regarded the action as
one brought by foreign seamen against a foreign vessel and declined jurisdiction. Id. A district court has discretion to refuse to retain jurisdiction in a
suit in admiralty between foreigners. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
46. 443 F.2d at 11.

The Fourth Circuit noted that the exercise of sound

discretion demanded that "before acting, the district court should be fully
informed about all factors that have a significant bearing on the question of
retaining jurisdiction." Id.
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information for decision of its motion," 47 the Lekkas court indicated
that further failure to cooperate with discovery on the jurisdiction
issue should be met with a sanction consisting of findings of fact suf48
ficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.
The rationale supporting discovery sanctions articulated by the
Fourth Circuit in Lekkas 49 was noted with approval by the Second
Circuit in Grammenos v. Lemos.50

In Lemos, the district court dis-

missed the action because of defective service of process before reaching
the issue of discovery with regard to jurisdictional facts. 1' Nevertheless, in dicta,5 2 the Second Circuit indicated that once service of process
was perfected, the principles of Lekkas would control. 53
47. Id. Two defendants had not answered interrogatories bearing on the
issue of ownership of the vessel by American interests; another had answered
that its ownership was evidenced by "bearer stock." Id. The Fourth Circuit
deemed this answer incomplete. Id.
48. Id. The Lekhas court indicated that the district court could take as
established that the ship was owned by American interests. Id. The court
further suggested that if justice required, the district court could enter a
default judgment on the issue of liability. Id.
49. For a discussion of Lekkas, see notes 43-48 and accompanying text
supra.
50. 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972). The Lemos case involved a claim
by two foreign seamen under the Jones Act against a vessel owned by a
Panamanian corporation. Id. at 1069. The plaintiffs alleged that the vessel
was ultimately owned, operated or controlled by American interests. Id.
51. Id. at 1070. The summons against the defendant was left at the
domicile of the defendant's sister rather than the defendant's usual abode.
Id. at 1071.
The district court dismissed on grounds of lack of personal
jurisdiction due to the defective service and forum non-conveniens. Id. at 1069.
52. Id. at 1074. While noting that service was properly quashed, the
Second Circuit reasoned that service of process might be perfected by means
other than those attempted, and therefore, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
was improper. Id. at 1071. The Second Circuit also deemed dismissal on
forum non-conveniens grounds to be inappropriate. Id. at 1069, 1074 n.5.
53. Id. at 1074. In so doing, the Second Circuit foreclosed the possibility
of an immediate dismissal on remand based on a finding of insufficient contacts with the United States to warrant exercise of the district court's discretionary admiralty jurisdiction. Id. The lower court had indicated that, had
service been valid, it would have granted summary judgment on this ground.
Id.
In the discussion of Lekkas, the Second Circuit did not comment on the
sanctions recommended by the Lekkas court, but emphasized the relevance of
the discovery function in the determination of jurisdiction. Id. at 1070. The
Lemos court paraphrased the Lekkas rationale and noted:
In Lekkas the court held that although American courts could decline
jurisdiction over claims of foreign seamen against foreign shipowners,
before doing so a court ought to satisfy itself that it had before it
full information on the factors that bear on its decision, such as the
ownership and control of the ship and the allegiance of the shipowner. And it held'that when shipowners requested the court to decline jurisdiction, they submitted to an obligation to provide information pertinent to the court's decision.
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In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Familia DeBoom v. Arosa Mercantile, S.A.54 expressly declined to follow both English and Lekkas.
In Familia DeBoom, the district court had entered a default judgment
against the defendants for their failure to comply with an order comThe Fifth Circuit reversed,
pelling answers to interrogatories. 55
reasoning that sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders
could only be imposed against parties within the court's jurisdiction.56
The court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed
only the procedures for obtaining jurisdiction, and not the principles
underlying the exercise of jurisdiction. 57 In addition, while recognizing
that the district court had jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,
the Fifth Circuit maintained that without the necessary facts on the
record, the imposition of a finding of jurisdiction by means of a
discovery sanction violated due process. 58
54. 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
The Familia DeBoom case arose when a freight vessel sank in the Gulf of
Mexico. 629 F.2d at 1136. One survivor and the representatives of a number
of deceased seamen brought suit under the Jones Act against the vessel's owner
and charterer. Id.
55. 629 F.2d at 1137. The plaintiffs' motion to compel answers to six
interrogatories directed to the vessel's owner was met with a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1136. The district
court granted the plaintiffs' motion and answers to the interrogatories were
filed. Id. The plaintiffs filed additional interrogatories, and the owner moved
to postpone discovery and to extend the time for answer. Id. at 1136-37. The
owner's motions regarding extensions and the earlier motion to dismiss were
heard along with a motion by the plaintiffs to compel answers to the new
interrogatories. Id. at 1137. The district court refused to consider the motion
to dismiss until the plaintiffs could gather jurisdictional facts through discovery, and ordered that answers to the interrogatories bearing on the jurisdiction issue be filed within 60 days. Id. Due to the owner's failure to comply
with the order, the district court, upon the plaintiffs' motion, entered a
Other interrogatories, such
sanction in the form of a default judgment. Id.
as the date and place of incorporation and whether the corporation had a
branch office in the United States, were directed to the vessel's charterer. Id.
at 1137 n.3. Since most of the answers consisted of a statement that "defendant
is unable at this time to answer," the district court included the vessel's charterer in the default judgment. Id. at 1137 .
56. Id. at 1139. The Fifth Circuit stressed that the burden to establish
jurisdiction was on the plaintiffs and concluded that the plaintiffs' inability to
obtain information from the defendants did not "exempt them from this
burden of proof." Id. at 1138. The court also recognized that its decision
created some difficulty for the district judge in trying to enforce his discovery
order, but reasoned that the result was compelled by due process limitations.
Id. at 1139.
57. Id. at 1139. The Familia DeBoom court maintained that the default
judgment would be valid "only if the court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendants." Id. at 1138. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[f]or us to uphold
the district court's order of default we must find facts in the record to support the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the defendants]." Id.
(emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1139. The Fifth Circuit indicated that the evidence in the record of contacts with the state in which the district court sat was insufficient to
satisfy due process notwithstanding the: Fifth Circuit's liberal application of
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In Cornpagnie des Bauxites, Judge Aldisert, writing for the ma-

jority, addressed the issue of whether the district court had abused its
discretion in imposing the Rule 37 sanction and in enjoining the pursuit of the British litigation. 9 The majority first reaffirmed the fundamental rule that in order to enjoin the action of a party, the court
must have personal jurisdiction over the party. 60 After noting that a
challenge to the court's in personam jurisdiction imposes a burden on
the plaintiff to prove jurisdictional facts, 6' Judge Aldisert reviewed the
chronology of the protracted pre-trial and discovery proceedings 62 and
concluded that the excess insurers had failed to make a good faith effort
to comply with the district court's order. 63 Rejecting as inadequate
the insurers' offer to make the documents available for inspection
abroad, the majority found that the district court's order compelling
64
production was well within its discretion.
the minimum contacts standard. Id. at 1138-39, citing International Shoe v.
Worthington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Standard Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625
F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Southwest Offset,
Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). The court, however,
allowed the plaintiffs an additional opportunity on remand to introduce facts
relevant to jurisdiction. 629 F.2d at 1140.
In considering English, the Fifth Circuit recognized that personal jurisdiction could be waived by a party, but found no waiver in the defendants'
failure to comply with the discovery orders. Id. The court stated: "There is
no waiver so long as the defendants expressly limited their appearance to the
determination of those very issues, which was done by [defendants] in this
case." Id. The Fifth Circuit distinguished English in noting that the record
in English contained facts sufficient to satisfy due process. Id. at 1139.

59. 651 F.2d at 880. For the Third Circuit's disposition of the injunction
issue, see note 22 supra.
60. 651 F.2d at 880, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969). In Zenith, which involved a patent dispute with a
subsidiary of Hazeltine, the Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the district
court's injunction against the parent corporation, which was not a named
party to the action. Id. at 112. The Supreme Court stated: "It is elementary
that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process." Id. at 110, citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,

40-41 (1940).

The Court continued: "The consistent constitutional rule has

been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation
unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." 395 U.S. at 110
(citations omitted).
61. 651 F.2d at 880-81, citing Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar Int'l,
Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977); DiCesare-Engler Prods., Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703, 705 (W.D. Pa. 1979).

62. 651 F.2d at 881-82. For a summary of the pre-trial and discovery proceedings, see notes 11-14 supra.
63. 651 F.2d at 882.

64. Id. at 883. Judge Aldisert noted that the offer to permit home office
inspection was made quite late in the proceedings and was not made as part
of any reply to a discovery request or at any of the hearings for extensions
of time, but was "tucked away in an affidavit filed by the insurers' New York
counsel supporting the summary judgment motion." Id. at 883-84, citing
App. at 312a, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981).
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After noting that the Rule 37 sanction imposed by the district
court should not be reversed unless it constituted an abuse of discretion,65 the majority concluded that the district court had not exceeded
its authority. 66 The sanction had been imposed, the court stressed,
"in response to the excess insurers' dilatory conduct in dealing with the
court throughout the discovery proceedings." 67 Judge Aldisert noted
that the sanction was appropriately limited to the purpose and scope
of the ordered discovery and established only those jurisdictional facts
which CBG was unable to obtain through discovery.68 In rejecting the
Fifth Circuit's position in Familia DeBoom, the Bauxites court reasoned: "As long as discovery orders are permissible in aid of the jurisdictional determination, we think it fairly follows that a district court
may respond to noncompliance by the party resisting a finding of jurisdiction with an appropriate rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction." 69
Dissenting in part,7 0 Judge Gibbons maintained that the district
court had abused its discretion in the imposition of the sanction establishing in personam jurisdiction. 71 The dissent distinguished the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over
65. 651 F.2d at 884, citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976) (per curiam); DiGregorio v.
First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Judge Aldisert
noted that if the sanction was "rationally related to the reasons given and the
requirements of the rule," it should not be overturned. 651 F.2d at 884,

citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
at 642.

He further noted that the review function of the circuit court was not

plenary, but that to disturb a lower court action, it was necessary to find "an
abuse of authority, not merely the presence of an alternative reasonable

choice." 651 F.2d at 885, citing 427 U.S. at 642. For a discussion of National
Hockey League, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
66. 651 F.2d at 885, citing English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723,
728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). For a discussion of English,
see notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
67. 651 F.2d at 885.
68. Id.
69. Id. judge Aldisert continued: "The availability of such a sanction is
particularly important when, as here, the very material sought to be discoveredthe defendants' contacts with the forum state-will normally be in the possession of a defendant and will frequently be unknown to a plaintiff." Id. Judge
Aldisert also noted that there was no question of unfair surprise to the defendants as the district court had given ample warning of the sanction it would
impose. Id. at 886, citing App. at 542a, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981). In a
footnote, Judge Aldisert addressed the alternative basis for in personam jurisdiction offered by the district court and concluded that the majority's holding
with regard to the Rule 37 sanction made discussion of this alternative determination unnecessary. 651 F.2d at 886 n.9.
70. 651 F.2d at 888 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Judge Gibbons joined the majority in reversing the injunction and in finding
that the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction over three of the excess
insurers. Id. For a brief summary of the majority's treatment of these issues,
see note 22 supra.
71. 651 F.2d at 892 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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claims arising out of those contacts with the forum, from the substantial
and continuous activity necessary to obtain general jurisdiction over
claims arising outside the forum.72 Noting that the case at bar involved an exercise of general jurisdiction, 73 Judge Gibbons reasoned
that in imposing the sanction the court took as established fact substantial and continuous activity in Pennsylvania by each of the foreign
insurers.74 Such facts could not be "carefully tailored" but were "extensive and pervasive." 75 He concluded: "The necessarily broad scope
of the jurisdictional facts the district court assumed, over defendant's
denial, and without placing the burden of discovery on plaintiff, was
an abuse of discretion." 76
The majority's deferential review of the district court's action in
Compagnie des Bauxites is consistent with the standard established by
the Supreme Court for review of Rule 37 sanctions.7 7 Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 78 and the case law confer broad discretion on the trial court to direct and control the discovery process. 79 In
72. Id. at 889 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), citing
Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

See generally Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
73. 651 F.2d at 889 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The dissent urged that the unilateral act of the plaintiff within the forum
state did not sufficiently connect the claim to the forum to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendants. Id., citing International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945) and its progeny: Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977);
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). According to

judge Gibbons:
Examination of the relevant transactions in this case reveals that the
only contact the excess insurers had with Pennsylvania concerning

this claim is too attenuated to meet the requirements of Hanson v.
Denckla and its progeny. That contact amounts to a phone call
placed by CBG's parent corporation's broker from Pittsburgh to
Bland, Welch in London requesting the London firm to secure agreements with foreign insurers in London to cover an African risk.
651 F.2d at 889 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
74. 651 F.2d at 890 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 891 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Gibbons urged that "the imposition of burdens of production in a distant place
is one of the core elements of unfairness which the due process cases from
International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . through World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson . . . address." Id.
77. The imposition of a sanction by the district court will not be reversed
unless the district court has abused its discretion. National Hockey League
v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (per curiam), reh. denied,
For a discussion of National Hockey League and the
429 U.S. 874 (1976).
Supreme Court's standard for review of Rule 37 sanctions, see notes 35-37 and
accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
79. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27, §§ 2006, 2176,
2215 & 2284.
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reaching the conclusion that the district court had not abused its discretion, Judge Aldisert closely examined the sequence of discovery
events which led to the sanction and their nexus to the scope of the
sanction imposed.80 This method of review is wholly consistent with
the analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc. 81

It is submitted, however,

that the Third Circuit's exclusive reliance on the terse, per curiam
opinion in National Hockey League offers meager justification for the
court's analysis of the breadth of Rule 37.82
It is also submitted that the majority opinion did not adequately
address the due process considerations raised by establishing personal
jurisdiction through the imposition of a Rule 37 sanction. 83 While not
apparently inconsistent with the holding in Hammond 84 and the
Rogers distinction between refusal to comply and inability to comply, 8
80. 651 F.2d at 881-83. For a summary of the pretrial and discovery proceedings in Compagnie des Bauxites, see notes 11-14 supra. For a statement

of Judge Aldisert's view regarding the scope of the discovery sanction, see
text accompanying note 68 supra.

81. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam). For a summary of the facts in
National Hockey League, see note 36 supra.
In National Hockey League, the Supreme Court quoted at length the
factual history of the discovery proceedings summarized in the district court's
memorandum opinion. 427 U.S. at 640-41. Noting that "the District Court
was required to consider the full record in determining whether to dismiss for
failure to comply with discovery orders," the Court concluded that "the comprehensive memorandum of the District Court supporting its order of dismissal indicates that the court did just that." Id. at 641-42, citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). Moreover, in discussing the
court of appeals' erroneous reversal of the district court's order, the National
Hockey League Court noted the tendency "to be heavily influenced by the
severity of outright dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order." 427 U.S. at 642. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned:
But here, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum

of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the

district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such
a deterrent.
Id. at 643. It is submitted that this supportive language is implicit in Judge
Aldisert's rationale.
82. It should be noted that National Hockey League involved dismissal of
an action for the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery orders. See notes
36 8c 81 supra. It is submitted that the cursory articulation by the Court, that
one who invokes the judicial authority should abide by it, suggests little guidance for a case where the sanctioned party has brought the court's authority
into question.
83. See note 76 supra. The majority asserted that due process was satisfied since the sanction was carefully tailored to the facts sought to be discovered. 651 F.2d at 886.
84. For a discussion of Hammond, see notes 30, 31 & 34 and accompanying
text supra.
85. See note 34 supra.
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the Bauxites opinion did not explicitly characterize the excess insurers'
dilatory conduct in terms of this distinction to meet the due process
implications.8 6 In addition, the bald assertion that the power to sanction is a corollary to the authority of the district court to order discovery
on the jurisdiction issue 87 fails to meet the due process concerns raised
in the dissent.88 Greater discussion by the majority of the district
court's alternative finding of minimum contacts on the record would
have aligned Bauxites with English as a case more in line with traditional minimum contacts analysis.8 9
Moreover, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's rationale was
not buttressed by sound reasoning available in opinions from other
circuits and in analogous discussion by the Supreme Court. 90 While
the application of a Rule 37 sanction to establish jurisdictional facts is
consistent with English,9 1 Judge Aldisert did not use the analysis developed in English to its fullest extent. The Eighth Circuit in English
noted, albeit in a footnote, that failure to comply with discovery might
reasonably be deemed a waiver of the right to object to the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction. 92 It is submitted that, in omitting this line
of reasoning, Judge Aldisert neglected an important aside in the English
rationale which would have added support for his analysis. 93 Similar
support for the majority's holding was available in the Supreme Court's
discussion in Hammond.94 Just as the Court in Hammond reasoned
that refusal to comply with discovery orders amounted to an admission
86. 651 F.2d at 885. The majority noted: "The excess insurers negligently
or deliberately flouted the district court's order compelling discovery." Id. It

is submitted that the majority might easily have characterized this contumacious
conduct as a refusal to comply, thus bringing the case squarely under Hammond
and Rogers.
87. 651 F.2d at 885.
88. Id. at 889-91 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For
discussion of the due process issue raised in the dissenting opinion, see notes
72-76 supra.
89. For a discussion of the majority's treatment of the district court's alternative finding, see note 69 supra. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's
distinction of English in Familia deBoom, see note 58 supra. For a discussion
of traditional minimum contacts analysis, see note 23 supra.
90. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra.
91. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's similar holding in English, see
notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
92. 590 F.2d at 728 n.5. For a discussion of this analysis by the Eighth
Circuit in English, see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
93. The notion of jurisdiction by conduct developed in English proves a
theoretically sounder response to the objection raised in Familia DeBoom that
the authority to impose discovery sanctions must proceed from establishhed
jurisdiction. It is at least arguable that, under English, jurisdiction was
predicated on the party's conduct, not on the assumption of facts which do not
appear in the record. For a discussion of the objection raised in Familia
deBoom, see notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
94. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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of the lack of merit in the case, Judge Aldisert might easily have maintained that the excess insurers' failure to comply constituted an implicit
admission that the requisite minimum contacts were present. 95
Finally, the factors which distinguish Judge Aldisert's opinion in
Bauxites from the Eighth Circuit's opinion in English will cause
Bauxites to have a greater impact in the Third Circuit than English may
have had in the Eighth Circuit.96 The stark logic of Judge Aldisert's
holding establishes the rule that in personam jurisdiction may be predicated on noncompliance with a discovery order directed to that issue.917
No showing of minimum contacts is required. The power of the district court rests solely in the initial authority to inquire into jurisdiction and authority under the federal rules to police the discovery
process.9 8
Compagnie des Bauxites, like English, Lekkas and Lemos evidences
a trend among the circuits to approve application of a Rule 37(b)(2)(A)
sanction to jurisdictional facts. The position of the majority in
Bauxites, moreover, points up the breadth of the current split with the
Fifth Circuit's view in Familia de Boom. 99 It is submitted, therefore,
that while the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Familia de Boom 100
and in English, 1o0 the irreconcilable positions of Familia de Boom and
Compagnie des Bauxites may create further division among the circuits
requiring Supreme Court resolution of the issue.
Stephen F.J. Martin
95. It must be noted that under Rogers, the presumption of admission
would be permissible only if the failure to comply was not due to an inability
to comply. See note 34 supra.
96. The Eighth Circuit in English noted that the record below revealed
sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." 590 F.2d at 728 n.6. Judge Aldisert in Bauxites noted
merely that CBG's allegation of minimum contacts was not fanciful. 651 F.2d
at 886 n.9.
97. 651 F.2d at 885.
98. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
99. The Fifth Circuit in Famila deBoom maintained that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are subject to due process limitations. See notes 56-58 and
accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit's position in Compagnie des
Bauxites suggests that the Federal Rules embody due process and are limited
in application only by their terms. See note 76 supra.
100. 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
101. 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
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FEDERAL COURTS AND PROCEDURE-CosTs-DIsTRIcr COURT HAS
DISCRETION TO AWARD EXPERT WITNESS FEES TO THE PREVAILING
PARTY WHEN THAT PARTY'S EXPERT PROVIDED TESTIMONY
WHICH PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE RESOLUTION

OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED.

Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos (1981)

On August 24, 1977, Captain Shelby C. Roberts, a Delaware River
pilot, fell from the gangway of the S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos. 1 Roberts
brought an unseaworthiness action against the owner of the ship, Capetandiamentis Cia Mar S.A. (CCM) in the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware. 2 At trial, CCM produced as a witness
Paul C. Keeler, an expert on gangway safety standards. 3 The district
court rendered judgment for CCM 4 and CCM filed a bill of costs in
the district court.5 The clerk denied CCM's request for recovery of
Mr. Keeler's expert witness fee 6 on the basis of District of Delaware
Rule 6.IB(4), which provides that expert witness fees are not "ordinarily
taxable" in excess of the statutory amount allowed for lay witnesses3
CCM then filed a motion for review of costs under Rule 54(d) of the
1. 651 F.2d 201, 202 (3d Cir. 1981).
2. Id. at 202. Roberts alleged that the gangway was unsafe. Id. at 206-07.
3. Id. at 202. The testimony of the Master of the CCM, Captain Petros
Nikiforos, was also introduced. Id. The district court, in response to Roberts'
motion, had ordered CCM to produce the Master for deposition at the office
of Roberts' attorney in Wilmington, Delaware. Id. Consequently, CCM flew
the Master from Greece to Wilmington. Id. The Master's deposition was
videotaped and the videotape was introduced at trial. Id.
4. Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos, No. 77-0301 (D. Del. July 13,
1979), aff'd mem., No. 79-2106 (3d Cir. March 21, 1980).
5. 651 F.2d at 202.
6. Id.
The district court clerk taxed various costs against Roberts. Id.
However, the clerk did not allow recovery of Keeler's expert witness fee or the
bulk of the Master's travel expenses. Id. The clerk based his denial of most
of the Master's travel expenses on the premise that an award of a witness'
travel expenses for distances over 100 miles was a matter within the discretion
of the court, rather than the clerk. Id.
7. Id. The District of Delaware Rule provides:
Fees of expert witnesses are not ordinarily taxable in an amount greater
than that statutorily allowable for ordinary witnesses; however, the
Court may allow, in its discretion, a reasonable amount as an additional award for expert witnesses, provided the Court finds that the
expert's testimony was not only helpful to the Court but also played
a crucial role in the resolution of the issues presented.
DISTRICT OF DELAWARE LOCAL RULE 6.1B(4).

(760)
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 but the district court summarily
9
affirmed the clerk's assessment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 10 reversed and remanded, 1 holding that a district court has discretion to award expert witness fees in excess of the statutory amount to
the prevailing party when the expert's testimony is indispensable to the
resolution of the case. Roberts v. S.S. Kyriakoula D. Lemos, 651 F.2d
201 (3d Cir. 1981).
Historically, under the general rule regarding taxation 12 of a party's
expenses as costs in the federal courts, prevailing parties in actions at
law were allowed to recover costs. 1" In equity cases, however, the district
8. 651 F.2d at 202. In the motion for review of costs, CCM contested both
the denial of expert fees and the denial of the travel expenses. Id.
Rule 54(d) provides:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but
costs against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by
the clerk on one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter, the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
9. 651 F.2d at 202. The district court also affirmed the clerk's denial of
the major portion of Captain Nikiforos' travel expenses. Id. However, the
court did award CCM an amount sufficient to cover the costs of transcripts and
the copying of exhibits. Id.
10. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Gibbons, Hunter, and Garth.
Judge Gibbons wrote the opinion of the court and Judge Garth filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I1. The Third Circuit remanded the issue to the district court for consideration of the matter in light of the newly enunciated standard. Id. at
207. The court also directed the district court to articulate its reasoning in
the application of this new standard. Id.
With regard to Captain Nikiforos' travel expenses, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the bulk of the expenses and directed
the district court to award CCM the full amount of Nikiforos' travel expenses.
Id. at 203. The Third Circuit held that it is an abuse of discretion not to
award costs that would not have been incurred but for the court's order made
on the losing party's motion, unless the losing party demonstrates circumstances
warranting an exercise of discretion in its favor. Id. In applying this principle, the Third Circuit found that: 1) the losing party (Roberts) had made
no showing of circumstances warranting an exercise of discretion in his favor;
and 2) the district court should have granted the motion to recover Nikiforos'
travel expenses. Id.
12. The word "taxation" is a term of art. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1309 (5th ed. 1979). When the court awards litigation expenses to the prevailing party, the costs are said to be "taxed" against the losing party. Id.
13. See Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 318 (1920). In Peterson, the
plaintiff brought an action at law to recover an amount alleged to be due
under a contract for the delivery of coal. Id. at 304. The defendant made
a motion for the appointment of an auditor to simplify the issues for the
jury. Id. Upon granting the motion, the district court stated that it had the
discretion to tax the auditor's fee as costs against either party or against both
parties. Id. at 317. The plaintiff challenged, inter alia, the district court's
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authority to tax the auditor's fee against a prevailing party. Id. The Supreme
Court held that the award of expenses in actions at law was not a matter of
the court's discretion but that prevailing parties could recover costs as of right.
Id. at 318. However, the Supreme Court did not direct the lower court to
refrain from taxing the auditor's expenses as costs until the conclusion of the
trial. Id. at 319. The Peterson court merely gave the plaintiff the opportunity
to petition the district court for modification of its order on auditor's costs or
to seek a writ of error in the court of appeals following a final judgment. Id.
The practice of awarding costs to a prevailing party derived from English
statutes. Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 1938).
Under English common law, litigation expenses were not taxable as costs. Id.
However, Parliament changed this common law rule by enacting statutes which
allowed prevailing parties to recover costs. See, e.g., Statute of Westminster,
1531, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 15, § 1 (1531) (defendant may be awarded costs when the
plaintiff has been nonsuited); Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 1, § 2
(1278) (successful plaintiff may recover litigation expenses). These English
statutes "became part of our general law under which costs were awarded to
the successful party." Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d at 348, citing
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
In the related area of taxing attorney's fees as costs, commentators have
debated the policy reasons for (the "English rule") and against (the "American
rule") the taxing of litigation expenses as costs. Professor Moore has stated:
The extent to which actual expenses are allowed as costs can have
a significant effect upon the encouragement or discouragement of
litigation. Advocates of the English practice claim that the allowance
of the successful party's legal expenses will only make him whole;
that it will discourage the institution of unfounded litigation or the
maintenance of groundless defenses, except possibly by financially
irresponsible persons, and at the same time will encourage a meritorious suit or defense. The proponents of the American practice claim,
however, that the English system deters the bringing of just claims or
the maintenance of a just defense as well as unjust ones, because of
the fear of being saddled with the opponent's legal expenses.
6 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70[2], at 1303-04 (2d ed. 1976)
(footnotes omitted).
Professors Wright and Miller have also commented on the subject. See
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2665, at 125 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]. They state that the English system has been
regarded as a fairer approach because the prevailing party is made completely
whole. Id. Moreover, the English rule is said to discourage baseless claims
and defenses by burdening the unsuccessful party with litigation expenses.
Id. However, Professors Wright and Miller recognize that arguments exist
in support of the American approach. Id. One such argument is based on
the notion that all citizens should have "relatively easy access to the courts."
Id. A related argument is that potential liability for litigation expenses might
discourage litigants from asserting meritorious claims or defenses. Id. See
also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 71, at 259 (1935).
McCormick gives three grounds upon which to base a rule allowing a prevailing party to recover costs. Id. First, the law normally permits a party
to recover compensation from one who has wronged him and, therefore, a
party who must sue or defend to protect his interests should recover costs from
the losing party. Id. Second, awarding litigation costs to the prevailing party
is in accord with the parties' reasonable expectations. Id. Finally, litigation
will be discouraged if the public realizes that a losing party may be liable
for the winner's litigation costs. Id.
See generally Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Note, Use of
Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 78
(1953); Note, Distribution of Legal Expenses Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J.
699 (1940).
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14
Under the modern
court had discretion to award costs to either party.
15
there is
approach, as stated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),
no distinction between law and equity 16 and the district court has dis17
Rule 54(d)
cretion to award the prevailing party his litigation costs.

14. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924). In Newton, the
gas company brought an equitable action to enjoin the state attorney general
from enforcing a state law which fixed the price of gas sold to private consumers. Id. at 80. The district court granted the injunction, but required
the gas company to post a bond during the course of the litigation equal to the
amount which the company would realize from charging a price over the
statutory maximum plus seven percent interest. Id. at 81. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court held that the rate-setting by the state legislature was a confiscatory taking which violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Id. at 80. Subsequently, the district court granted the gas company's motion
for its expenses in posting the bond. Id. at 81. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that: 1) a district court has discretion to tax expenses as costs
against the losing party in an equitable action; and 2) a party may recover
the costs of premiums paid pursuant to a court order requiring the posting
of a bond in an equitable action. Id. at 83, 86.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). For the text of Rule 54(d), see note 8 supra.
Rule 54 became effective on September 16, 1938 and it set forth general provisions concerning judgments, as well as provisions relating to costs. W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1191, at 6 (C. Wright ed.
1958). The judgment provisions of Rule 54 are derived from former Equity
Rule 71 and the procedural practices of various states. Id. The Advisory Committee's Note states that the present rule for taxing costs as expenses is found
in Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). Advisory Committee's Note, FED.
R. Civ. P. 54. See also Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal
Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935). For a discussion of Peterson, see note 12
supra.
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure govern all civil cases, regardless of whether the action is legal
or equitable. Id. See also United States v. Bowden, 182 F.2d 251, 252 (10th
Cir. 1950); Harris v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 139 F.2d 571, 572 n.1
(2d Cir. 1943).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Absent express statutory provisions or rules,
the prevailing party is allowed costs "unless the court otherwise directs." Id.
The discretion of the district court to award costs has been widely recognized.
See, e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock 8: Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 283-84
(1946); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1978); Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 423 F.2d 106, 110 (8th Cir.
1970); Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Mach. Corp., 359 F.2d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1966).
With respect to the exercise of this discretion, Professors Wright and Miller
have noted that "federal courts are free to pursue a case-by-case approach and
to make their decisions on the basis of the circumstances and equities of each
case, including such matters as the efforts and expenses of the parties." C.
However, the prevailing party has
WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 2668, at 142.
the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the costs are taxable. True
Temper Corp. v. C.F. 8 I. Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 509-10 (10th Cir. 1979);
Lichter Found. Inc. v. Welch, 269 F.2d 142, 146 (6th Cir. 1959). In addition, district courts may establish rules to serve as guidelines in taxing litigation expenses
as costs. McWilliams Dredging Co. v. Department of Highways, 187 F.2d 61,
63 (5th Cir. 1951); Williams v. Sawyer Bros., Inc., 51 F.2d 1004, 1005 (2d Cir.
1931). This authority derives from Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which permits the district courts to promulgate rules not inconsistent with the federal rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83. An example of this
kind of local rule is District of Delaware Local Rule 6.1B(4). For the text
of Rule 6.1B(4), see note 7 supra.
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governs the award of costs in the federal courts unless an express cost
provision is made in a federal statute 18 or a federal rule. 19
The taxation of witness fees as costs is specifically addressed by
federal statute.2 ° Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, a district judge or clerk of
court may tax witness fees as costs. 21 The amount of the fees and expenses which a party must pay his witness is set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821.22 Generally, the federal courts have treated these statutory
In reviewing costs awards, the circuit courts generally state that the taxing of expenses as costs lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 476 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir.
1973); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 362 F.2d 799,
800-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966). The circuit courts have
reversed district court orders regarding costs only upon a finding of an abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre
Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court's failure to articulate
reasons for denial of costs was an abuse of discretion); Samuel v. University of
Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1976) (district court abused discretion by
not giving reasons for denying costs).
18. See FjED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). For examples of statutes which set forth
express cost provisions, see Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976
and Supp. 1980) (successful plaintiff may recover costs of the action, as well
as a reasonable attorney's fee); Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 941 (1976)
(judge shall include costs of the suit and reasonable attorney's fees for any
prevailing plaintiff); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1976)
(injured party may recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees).
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). There are several rules which expressly
govern taxability of expenses as costs. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d), 53(a),
71A(l). Rule 41(d) states:

If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of
costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and
may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d).

Rule 53(a) provides:
The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the
court, and shall be darged upon such of the parties or paid out of
any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the custody and
control of the court as the court may direct.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
Rule 71A(l) states: "Costs in a condemnation of property proceeding are
not subject to Rule 54(d)." FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(1).
20. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920(3) (1976).
21. Id. § 1920(3). Section 1920(3) permits a district judge or court to tax
the "fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses" as costs. Id.
22. Id. § 1821. The relevant portions of this section provide:
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance
at any court of the United States, or before a United States Magistrate, or before any person authorized to take his deposition pursuant
to any rule or order of a court of the United States, shall be paid the
fees and allowances provided by this section . ...
(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each
day's attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee
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for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the
place of attendance at the beginning and end of such attendance or
at any time during such attendance.
Id. The statute also provides for payment of certain travel expenses. See id.
§ 1821(c), (d). These travel expenses include the actual expenses which the
witness incurs in travelling, provided that the witness uses the "shortest practical route" and/or the "most economical rate reasonably available" for a common carrier. Id. § 1821(c)(1). Toll charges, taxicab fares and parking fees,
as well as "all normal travel expenses," are also allowed. Id. § 1821(c)(3),(4).
For witnesses who must stay overnight, the statute provides a subsistence
allowance. Id. § 1821(d)(1).
Separate statutory provisions govern the payment of witness fees to federal
government employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5537, 5751 (1976).
Congress first enacted legislation for compensation of witnesses in 1792.
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 277 (1792). However, this statute did
not deal with a witness' travel expenses. See id. It was not until 1799 that
Congress provided for such expenses. See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 6,
1 Stat. 626 (1799). The travel expenses were limited to five cents a mile for
the trip from the witness' home to the courthouse and back. Id. Congress
has changed the allowable amount for compensation and travel expenses to
reflect increases in actual costs. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No.
90-274, § 102(b), 70 Stat. 798 (1956). The current federal provision for compensation and travel expenses of witnesses is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976
& Supp. 1981).
Mileage allowances under § 1821 have traditionally been limited by the
territorial range of the court's subpoena power. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1);
Friedman v. Washburn Co., 155 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1946). In Friedman, the
defendant prevailed in a patent infringement suit and the plaintiff was taxed
by the court with the travel expenses of the defendant's witnesses. Id. at 962.
These travel expenses included the expenses of witnesses who had come from
beyond the 100 mile reach of the court's subpoena power. Id. at 962-63. The
witnesses had travelled over 2200 miles to testify. Id. at 963. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit modified the costs award by limiting the witness' allowable
travel distance to 100 miles. Id. The Friedman court stated that "it has
been practically universally held that mileage to witnesses is taxable to the
full extent of the distance that they can be legally reached by subpoena, but
not more than 100 miles." Id., citing Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d
347 (5th Cir. 1938); Kirby v. United States, 273 F. 391 (9th Cir. 1921). See
also Spiritwood Grain Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 179 F.2d 338 (8th Cir.
1950); Lee v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 93 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of awarding travel expenses for
witnesses who must travel distances greater than 100 miles. See Farmer v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964). In Farmer, the Court held that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion in disallowing the travel expenses of
witnesses who travelled over 100 miles to testify. Id. at 235. However, the
Court added that "[w]e cannot accept either the extreme position of the company that the old 100-mile rule has no vitality for any purpose or Farmer's
argument that a federal district court can never under any circumstances tax
as costs expenses for transporting witnesses more than 100 miles." Id. at 232.
After Farmer, some courts have adhered to the traditional rule and have
continued to deny expenses for witness' travel exceeding 100 miles. See, e.g.,
Vorburger v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 47 F.R.D. 571 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Erving
Paper Mills v. Hudson-Sharp Mach. Co., 271 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
The Vorburger court stated that, despite the Supreme Court's holding in
Farmer, it would retain the 100-mile rule. 47 F.R.D. at 573.
However, other courts have taxed witness' travel expenses over 100 miles
as costs. See, e.g., Fleet Inv. Co. v. Rogers, 620 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1980);
Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 587 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979);
American Steel Works v. Hurley Constr. Co., 46 F.R.D. 465 (D. Minn. 1969).
In Rogers, the Tenth Circuit cited Farmer for the proposition that "a district
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allowances as the maximum rate at which a district court may tax witness expenses as costs. 23 For example, in Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co.,24 the Supreme Court applied this
general rule to expert witness fees and held that a party may not recover
costs expended for an expert witness in a sum greater than the standard
for nonexpert witnesses set forth in section 1821.25
In a more recent case, Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co.,26 the
Court addressed the issue of a district court's discretion to award costs.
court has discretion to approve travel costs in excess of 100 miles from the
place at which the trial is held." 620 F.2d at 794.
23. See, e.g., Dunn v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8c Smith, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 937, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also J. MOORE, supra note 13,
54.77
[5.-4], at 1733; C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 2678, at 227.
Courts have tended to treat the subject of taxation of expert fees in a
conclusory manner and have often failed to provide supporting rationale for
limitations on expert fees. See, e.g., Gerber v. Stoltenberg, 394 F.2d 179
(5th Cir. 1968); Advanced Business Sys. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143
(D. Md. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
920 (1970); Scarmucci v. Universal Mfg. Co., 234 F. Supp. 290 (W.D. La. 1964).
24. 284 U.S. 444 (1932).
25. Id. at 448. In Henkel, the plaintiff prevailed on a claim brought
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota. Id. at 444. The plaintiff then sought to recover
the fees which she had paid the expert witnesses who had testified at trial. Id.
She contended that a Minnesota statute granted judges the discretion to tax
expert witness fees as costs and that the district court should adhere to the
state practice. Id. at 445-47. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion
and the court of appeals certified the issue to the Supreme Court. Id. at 445.
The Supreme Court noted that "Congress has dealt with the subject [of witness fees] comprehensively and has made no exception of the fees of expert
witness." Id. at 447. The Court concluded that Congressional legislation
"must be deemed controlling, and excludes the application in the federal
courts of any different state practice." Id. (citations omitted).
Although the Henkel Court's ruling involved the predecessor of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821, the Report of the Senate Committee on the bill which eventually became § 1821 is consistent with the principle established in Henkel. See S.
REP. No. 187, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1231-32 (1949). The Report stated:
The amounts arrived at in this bill are considered to be more fair
than presently. existing amounts, although it is presently recognized
that certain witnesses will not be adequately compensated. In order
to fairly compensate everyone appearing as a witness it would be necessary to have either a graduated scale of fees, or leave the amount of
such fees in the discretion of the judge. Neither was considered
feasible, and therefore the amounts arrived at herein are more or less
arbitrary, but considered to be reasonably fair to the average witness.
Id. In 1978, the statutory allowances were again increased. See Pub. L. No.
95-535, § 1, 92 Stat. 2033 (1978).
26. 379 U.S. 227 (1964). In Farmer, the plaintiff brought an action for
damages for an alleged breach of an employment contract. Id. at 228. At
trial, the plaintiff contended that he had been wrongfully terminated and the
employer refuted this contention with the testimony of three witnesses who
came from Saudi Arabia to New York to testify. Id. at 228-29. After the
jury failed to reach a verdict, the district court granted the employer's motion
for a directed verdict and awarded the employer the costs of flying the witnesses from Saudi Arabia. Id. at 229. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed
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Although the holding in Farmer dealt with witnesses' travel expenses, 27
the Court implicitly recognized the discretion of a district judge under
28
Rule 54(d) to award costs not specifically allowed by statute.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Farmer, some courts have
adhered to the Henkel rule that the federal courts have no authority to
award expert witness fees exceeding the section 1821 allowance. 29 In
the district court's grant of a directed verdict and remanded the case for a
new trial. Id. The Second Circuit also vacated the award for the travel costs.
Id. On remand, the case was dismissed by a different judge and the award
of costs to the employer, though including other costs not specified in § 1821,
did not include the travel expenses of the witnesses from Saudi Arabia. Id.
at 230. The employer appealed the costs issue and the Second Circuit held
that the district court had abused its discretion under Rule 54(d) by lowering
the award of costs. Id. However, the Second Circuit's modification of the
costs award allowed only the transportation costs of one of the witnesses, since
the court found that the employer had not incurred any extra expense in
flying the other twko witnesses to New York. Id. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. Id.
27. Id. at 235. The Farmer Court found that the judge on remand had
not abused his discretion in disallowing the travel expenses of all three witnesses from Saudi Arabia. Id. For a discussion of the history of witness'
travel expenses, see note 21 supra.
28. 379 U.S. at 235. Specifically, the Court stated:
We do not read that Rule [54(d)] as giving district judges unrestrained discretion to tax costs to reimburse a winning litigant for
every expense he has seen fit to incur in the conduct of his case. Items
proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful
scrutiny. Any other practice would be too great a movement in the
direction of some systems of jurisprudence, that are willing, if not
indeed anxious, to allow litigation costs so high as to discourage litigants from bringing lawsuits, no matter how meritorious they might
in good faith believe their claims to be. Therefore, the discretion
given district judges to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with
reference to expenses not specifically allowed by statute. Such a restrained administration of the Rule is in harmony with our national
policy of reducing insofar as possible the burdensome cost of litigation.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Adam v. Carlson, 521 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975); Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975). In Carlson, a group
of prisoners at Marion Federal Penitentiary filed suit to protest certain practices conducted at the prison. 521 F.2d at 169. The plaintiffs prevailed on
the merits and moved to recover, inter alia, the fees of their expert witnesses.
Id. However, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for expert fees.
Id. at 172. The Seventh Circuit upheld this decision, noting that a successful
party may recover only the amount stated in § 1821 for its expert witnesses. Id.
at 172, citing Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., Minneapolis c Omaha Ry. Co., 284
U.S. 444 (1932); Baum v. United States, 432 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1970); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
In Ott, the plaintiff was a student at Knoxville Business College. 518 F.2d
at 1145. She filed a class action, claiming that a contract between the College
and Speedwriting Publishing Company (Speedwriting) discouraged competition in the market for shorthand books and, consequently, violated the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. The district court denied class certification
and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 1146. On appeal, the Ott court found
that the small amount in controversy involved in the plaintiff's individual
claim made it impracticable for the plaintiff to bring the suit as anything
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Baum v. United States,30 the district court granted a motion to recover
31

expert witness fees made by the prevailing party in an admiralty action.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Rule 54(d) provides that costs
should generally be allowed to the successful party, but that expert fees
32
above the allowance of section 1821 may not be recovered.
However, other courts have created exceptions to the Henkel rule
and have awarded expert fees notwithstanding the section 1821 limitation.33 One common exception arises in cases involving civil rights

claims.3 4 The award of expert witness fees has also been approved upon
a showing of "exceptional circumstances,"

for example, when a losing

but a class action. Id. at 1149. In the course of reaching this conclusion,
the Sixth Circuit stated that: 1)a district court should not award expert fees
in antitrust litigation; 2) a prevailing plaintiff in a private antitrust suit may
recover only those costs permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Rule 54(d); and
3) even an award of costs under § 1920 and Rule 54(d) would not be a "sufficient incentive" for a plaintiff to continue an antitrust claim after certification
of the class has been denied. 518 F.2d at 1149 (citations omitted). However,
the Ott court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing the class action
since the trial judge had properly concluded that the plaintiff's situation differed from that of the other members of the class. Id.
See also Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1056 (7th Cir. 1974) (the
lower court erred in taxing the costs of an expert witness in excess of the
statutory allowance); Frigiquip Corp. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 75 F.R.D. 605,
616 (W.D. Okla. 1977) ("[e]xpert witness fees are not a taxable event"); Kaiser
Indus. Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 5, 13 (E.D. Mich. 1970) ("it
is well established that the fees of an expert witness in excess of statutory witness fees are not taxable costs"); J. MOORE, supra note 13,
54.77 [5.-3], at
1734; C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 2678, at 236.
30. 432 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 86. In Baum, one of the prevailing parties, Jacksonville Shipyards, was a third-party defendant. Id. In the course of defending against
the admiralty suit, Jacksonville Shipyards presented three expert witnesses at a

cost of $400.

Id. The plaintiff, Baum, lost at trial and, subsequently, Jack-

sonville Shipyards moved to recover the costs of its expert witnesses. Id.
32. Id. at 86, citing Department of Highways v. McWilliams Dredging
Co., 10 F.R.D. 107 (W.D. La. 1950), aJ'd, 187 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1951).
33. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text infra.
34. See, e.g., Cagle v. Cox, 87 F.R.D. 467 (E.D. Va. 1980); Commonwealth
v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir.
1978); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
In Cagle, the plaintiffs, prisoners at the Powhatan Correctional Center,
made a pretrial motion requesting an authorization of an expenditure
of funds to retain expert witnesses.
87 F.R.D. at 468. The expert
witnesses were to testify at trial concerning the plaintiffs' allegations of
the prison's "overcrowding, pervasive physical violence, unsanitary conditions,
and inadequate health care." Id. The Cagle court stated that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920(3) and Rule 54(d) governed the award of expert fees. Id. at 469. Next,
the court noted that the general rule was that district courts should not tax expert fees in excess of the § 1821 allowance. Id. (citations omitted). However,
the district court stated that it had equitable discretion to award expert fees
above the § 1821 amount when: 1) the expert witness' testimony is "necessary to
the presentation of a party's claim" or exceptional circumstances exist; 2) the
party has made a prior application to the court explaining the necessity or exceptional circumstances alleged to justify an award of expert fees; and 3) the
expert's fee is reasonable. Id. at 471. Applying this test, the court held that the
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party has conducted his case in bad faith. 35 Finally, in Welsch v.
Likins,36 the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
experts' testimony would be "indispensable to the plaintiffs' counsel in presenting this case and will be extremely helpful to the Court in evaluating plaintiffs' claim." Id. at 472. Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiffs had
made the requisite prior application to the court and that the expert fees
seemed to be reasonable. Id.
In O'Neill, the plaintiffs challenged various personnel practices of the
Philadelphia Police Department on the grounds that the procedures were
racially discriminatory. 431 F. Supp. at 701. The district court found for the
plaintiffs and issued an injunction. Id. at 702. After the Third Circuit
affirmed, the plaintiffs moved to recover the fees of the expert witnesses that
they had employed during the hearing for injunctive relief. Id. After noting
that the general rule forbids awarding expert fees, the district court held that
equitable considerations favored awarding expert fees when the expert's testimony was crucial to the case. Id. at 713. Reviewing the various experts who
testified, the O'Neill court concluded that the experts were crucial in proving
the plaintiffs' civil rights claim and awarded the expert fees as costs. Id. at
713-15.
In Volpe, the plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the construction
of a state highway project. 57 F.R.D. at 95. After prevailing on the merits,
the plaintiffs sought an award of expert fees. Id. at 102. The court granted
the award, holding that the experts' affidavits were "quite helpful to the
Court, and were a crucial part of the plaintiffs' presentation." Id. The
Volpe court further supported its holding by stating that the expert fee award
advanced the strong public policies of protecting the beauty of the park and
preserving the recreational benefits associated with a park. Id. at 99.
See also Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981). In Jones, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress intended that private litigants in civil
rights cases should recover the full costs which were incurred in vindicating
their rights. Id. at 1382, citing S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5910. The Jones court
also noted that an allowance of full costs will encourage citizens to assert
their civil rights. 636 F.2d at 1382.
35. See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d
631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). In Kinnear, the plaintiff
contended, inter alia, that the defendant and another party had altered one
of the physical exhibits to be introduced at trial. 441 F.2d at 637 n.5. The
trial judge denied the motion by plaintiff's counsel to remove the issue of the
allegedly altered exhibit from consideration and the issue was tried. Id. The
defendant produced several expert witnesses to refute the contention that
any exhibits were altered. Id. at 636-37. The district court found for the
defendant on the issue and awarded the defendant the costs of his expert
witnesses. Id. at 637. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the costs award, holding
that a prevailing party may recover expert fees when "an unfounded action
or defense is maintained in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." Id. See also J. MooRE, supra note 13,
54.77 [5.-3], at 1735 (stating
that "[t]here is some intimation that, in the exercise of general equitable discretion, a court may permit an additional allowance to be taxed as costs, provided that the situation is exceptional and the court makes an order to that
effect prior to the production of the expert").
Although Moore states that the party who seeks to recover expert fees
must make an application to the court before the expert witness is called,
some courts which have awarded such fees have not required prior application. See, e.g., Worley v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Miss.
1978); Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 525 F.2d
987 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. 68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir.
1975).
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set forth another exception to the Henkel rule in granting an award of
expert fees when the expert testimony of the prevailing party was crucial
37
to the resolution of the issue before the court.
Against this background, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the district court had discretion to award expert witness fees in
excess of the statutory figure.38 The Roberts court noted that "a long
37. 68 F.R.D. at 596-97. In Welsch, six mentally retarded resident-patients of Minnesota state hospitals brought a class action on behalf of all
mentally retarded patients who had been judicially committed under the civil
commitment provisions of the Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment
Act. Id. at 590, citing MINN. STATE ANN. 253 A.01-A.21 (West 1968). The
plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the issue of whether
mentally retarded citizens who have been civilly committed have a fourteenth
amendment due process right, or a right under the state commitment statute,
to treatment which is aimed at improving the patients' conditions. 68 F.R.D.
at 591. The plaintiffs also contended that certain conditions at one of the
state hospitals violated the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. At trial, the plaintiffs presented several expert witnesses to prove the
allegations made in the complaint. Id. The district court found for the plaintiffs and granted the requested relief. Id.
Subsequently, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to have the
expert fees taxed as costs. Id. at 595-96, citing Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 379 U.S. 222 (1964); Linneman Constr. Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co.,
504 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Farmer, see notes 26-28 and
accompanying text supra. The Welsch court stated that "these expert witnesses were an indispensible [sic] part of this trial" and that "[t]heir experience in governmentally operated programs for the retarded was clearly reflected
in their testimony and added greatly to the Court's knowledge." 68 F.R.D. at
597. The court further noted that 'the taxing of costs is merely an incident of
litigation and [costs] are routinely taxed by the clerk against a losing party." Id.
at 596 (citation omitted).
The district court for the Northern District of Mississippi reached a similar
result in Brooks v. Town of Sunflower, No. GC 71-57-K (N.D. Miss. March 27,
1974). In Brooks, the district court held that the services of the plaintiff's
expert, a consultant engineer, were an "absolute necessity" for the presentation
of the plaintiff's claim that the town's plans for certain municipal services
were insufficient and that, consequently, the expert fees should be taxed as
costs. Brooks v. Town of Sunflower, as stated in Worley v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 79 F.R.D. 534, 541 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
38. 651 F.2d at 203. CCM argued that the district court's failure to award
expert witness fees constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. Roberts contended
that § 1821 provided the sole authority for taxing witness fees as costs and
stressed the Supreme Court's decision in Henkel as support for this proposition.
Id. at 204. Since the district court clerk had already granted CCM the maximum per day award allowable for witnesses under § 1821, Roberts asserted
that the district court had no authority to increase the award. Id. at 204.
For a discussion of Henkel, see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of § 1821, see note 22 supra.
The Third Circuit stated that Roberts' argument conflicted with its decision in Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, in which the court declined to
determine the appropriateness of awarding expert fees in the Third Circuit.
651 F.2d at 204, citing Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, 622 F.2d 692 (3d
Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit also noted that Roberts' position conflicted
with District of Delaware Local Rule 6.1B(4), which states that a district court
may award expert fees when the expert's testimony "played a crucial role in
the resolution of the issues presented." 651 F.2d at 204. Therefore, the
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line of decisions, including some from district courts within this Circuit,
have upheld the general rule that federal courts have no authority to
tax as costs the compensation of expert witnesses in excess of the statutory attendance per day, mileage, and subsistence provided in section
1821." 39 However, the court recognized that there have been exceptions 40 to the general rule and proceeded to discuss various instances
in which courts have found it appropriate to award an amount equiva41
lent to the actual compensation paid to the experts.
The court's discussion focused predominantly on cases espousing the
proposition that expert fees should be permitted when the expert's testimony is crucial to the resolution of the issue before the court. 42

This

Roberts court found that if Roberts' contention were correct, both Walker and
the Delaware rule would have to be declared invalid. Id.
39. 651 F.2d at 204, citing Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., Minneapolis, &
Omaha Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444 (1932); Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining
the Environment v. Volpe, 65 F.R.D. 608 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Quetel v. Querrand,
273 F. Supp. 341 (D.V.I. 1968); C. WRIGHT, supra note 13, § 2678, at 236-37
n.62.
40. 651 F.2d at 204. At this point in its analysis, the Third Circuit discussed Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1978). In O'Neill, the district court
noted that despite the general rule prohibiting the award of expert witness
fees, many courts had taxed expert fees as costs where "'the expert's testimony was helpful to the court and played an important role in the resolution of the issues.'" 651 F.2d at 204, quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. at 713. The O'Neill court expressed its agreement

with the recent trend and awarded the expert fees to the prevailing party.
Id. For additional discussion of O'Neill, see note 34 supra.
41. 651 F.2d at 205. The Roberts court listed several decisions which

employed the same principle that the district court enunciated in Common-

wealth of Pennsylvania v. O'Neill. Id. at 205, citing Cagle v. Cox, 87 F.R.D.

467 (E.D. Va. 1980); Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn.), aff'd per

curiam, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975); Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192
(W.D. La. 1974), modified, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975); La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afj'd, 488 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.,
aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). However, the majority recognized that these
cases could be distinguished from the case at bar since they were all civil

rights suits and the awarding of expert fees was often granted "to effectuate
Congress' intent to encourage initiation of civil rights actions." 651 F.2d at
205.

The majority surveyed other decisions which have allowed a party to

recover expert's costs.

Id. at 205.

The Roberts court cited Henkel for the

proposition that a court has equitable discretion to tax as costs a court-appointed expert's fees even if the fees are greater than the amount allowed

under § 1821.

Id. at 205-06.

The Third Circuit also noted the Fifth Cir-

cuit's holding in Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. that a

losing party whose litigation conduct is vexatious or oppressive may be responsible for the prevailing party's expert fees. Id. at 205, citing KinnearWeed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir.

1971).
42. 651 F.2d at 205-06, citing Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589 (D. Minn.),
afj'd per curiam, 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing expert witness fees to
experts whose testimony was an indispensable part of the trial). The Roberts
court stated that the "central concern of all courts that have awarded expert
fees as costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) has focused on the necessity of the
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discussion led to an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Farmer,
which the Roberts court interpreted as not requiring "a parsimony to
the extent of precluding recovery of legitimate and indispensable litigation expenditures." 43 Thus, the Third Circuit formulated the rule that
a district court has the discretion to award expert witness fees when the
expert's testimony is "indispensable to the determination of the case." 44
In applying this rule to the case at bar, the Roberts court found
that the district court's summary affirmance of the clerk's assessment
provided an insufficient record to determine whether the expert's testimony was necessary to the resolution of the case. 45 Since the Third
Circuit could not determine from the record whether the district court
had abused its equitable discretion to award expert fees, the court reversed and remanded the issue to the district court for reconsideration
40

of its ruling.

expert's testimony." 651 F.2d at 205. The majority also discussed the following cases to support this proposition: Brooks v. Town of Sunflower, No. GC
71-57-K (N.D. Miss. March 27, 1974) (allowing award of consulting engineer's
fee since his testimony was an absolute necessity to a resolution of the issue
presented in that the subject matter was beyond the competence of a layman);
Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 102 (N.D. Miss.
1964) (recognizing that expert fees are sometimes recoverable, but holding the

expert's testimony not sufficiently essential to the resolution of the case). 651
F.2d at 205.
43. 651 F.2d at 206. The Roberts majority reasoned that Farmer apparently grants district judges a limited discretion to award costs that are not
specifically authorized by § 1821. Id. The Third Circuit stated that the
Farmer Court based its decision "not on a Henkel-like theory of statutory
preclusion of costs not listed in § 1821, but on policy considerations militating
against award of unenumerated costs." Id. (footnotes omitted). Roberts also
stressed the Farmer Court's concern that a prevailing party might seek to
recover unnecessary and vexatious costs and concluded that a district court
should exercise careful scrutiny in examining a prevailing party's bill of costs
to ensure that an award will compensate just the expenses necessary to the
litigation. Id.
44. Id. at 206. The court noted that it agreed with the District of Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit that Farmer affords a district court this equitable
discretion. Id. The court further noted that the Farmer principle and the
rationale supporting decisions which have awarded expert fees were congruent
with Delaware Local Rule 6.1B(4). Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit held
that Local Rule 6.lB(4) is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1821. 651 F.2d at 206.
For a discussion of Local Rule 6.1B(4), see note 7 and accompanying text
supra.
45. 651 F.2d at 207. The Third Circuit stated that, in a cause of action
based on a fall from an allegedly unsafe gangway, testimony from a gangway
safety standard expert would appear to be crucial to a determination of liability. Id. However, since the clerk's assessment simply quoted the rule and
stated that the fees would not be awarded, the Roberts court could not determine the necessity of the expert testimony. Id.
46. Id. at 206-07. The Roberts court also considered the propriety of the
district court's failure to allow CCM to recover its costs in producing the commander of CCM's ship, Captain Nikiforos, for deposition at the office of
Roberts' attorney in Wilmington. Id. at 202. First, the Third Circuit noted
that the district court has discretion to award a witness' travel expenses exceeding 100 miles. Id., citing Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964).
However, the Roberts court acknowledged that some courts hold that § 1821
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It is submitted that although the Roberts decision may provide a
just approach to the award of expert witness fees, it is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent 47 and untenable in the face of the explicit
9
language of Rule 54(d) 48 and the legislative history of section 1820
The Third Circuit's approach does allow a prevailing party to recover
the expert fees which he would not have incurred but for his adversary's
conduct G0 and will return the prevailing party to the position that he
held before the litigation was commenced. 5' Moreover, since people
generally realize that they must account for their actions which cause
others to incur expenses, the Roberts holding of taxing expert fees as
costs conforms to the principle that a wrongdoer should fully compen52
sate the party whom he has injured.
requires that a witness' expenses for traveling to and from the United States
be taxed as costs. 651 F.2d at 203, citing Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 46 F.R.D. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dunn v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 279 F. Supp 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court further
noted that these decisions may have been discredited by the Second Circuit's
decision in a 1969 case which upheld a district court's denial of a witness'
travel expenses from Europe, stating that taxation of such expenses as costs
was discretionary. 651 F.2d at 203 n.2, citing Arico v. Cie de Navegacion
Transoceanique, 409 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1969).
Next, the Roberts court stated that it need not decide whether § 1821
requires taxation of the travel expenses of a witness coming from a foreign
country. 651 F.2d at 203. The Third Circuit held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny recovery of production costs to the prevailing party when the
court orders the production of a witness based on the losing party's motion and
the prevailing party would not have incurred the production costs but for the
court order. Id. at 203. The Roberts court added that this principle would
not apply if the losing party could prove that the circumstances warrant an
exercise of discretion in his favor. Id. Since the Third Circuit decided that

Roberts had made no showing of such circumstances, it remanded the case to

the district court and directed the court to award CCM the full travel expenses
incurred in producing Captain Nikiforos. Id. For a discussion of the awarding of a witness' travel expenses, see note 22 supra.
In a separate opinion, judge Garth stated his full agreement with the
majority's resolution of the expert fee issue. Id. at 207 (Garth, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part). However, he disagreed with the majority's
direction to the lower court to enter an order awarding Captain Nikiforos'
entire travel expenses. Id. judge Garth believed that the travel fee issue
should be remanded so that the district court could exercise its discretion. Id.
He contended that only after the district court was given an opportunity to exercise its discretion on the issue of CCM's application for Captain Nikiforos'
travel expenses should an appellate court hear the issue. Id.
47. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.
48. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text infra.
49. See note 62 and accompanying text infra.
50. See C. McCoumicK, supra note 13. This view is supported by Professor McCormick's conclusion that taxing expert fees as costs permits the prevailing party to recover expenses to which his opponent has wrongfully exposed
him. Id.
54.70[21, at 1303-04 (stating that
51. See J. MOORE, supra note 13,
allowance of a prevailing party's legal expenses would only make him whole).
Id.
52. See C. McCoRmicK, supra note 13, § 71, at 259. Professor McCormick
,has noted that taxing expert witness fees against the losing party "seems most
adapted to satisfy the reasonable expectations of men." Id.
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However,. the Third Circuit's approach is in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court's holding in Henkel that a party may not recover expert
witness fees which exceed the allowance set forth in section 1821.53 The
Roberts court avoided the application of the Henkel rule by interpreting
the Court's language in Farmer as authorizing district judges to exercise
their discretion and allow costs not specifically mentioned in section
1821.14 The Third Circuit relied, in part, on the district court's opinion
in Welsch to support this reading of Farmer.55 However, an analysis of
Farmer reveals that the holding specifically addressed a witness' travel
expenses 56 and that the language which the Roberts court highlighted
was far too general to support an application to an expert witness'
fees.5 7 It is further suggested that a district court's interpretation of
Farmer constitutes inadequate authority for the Third Circuit's refusal
to follow the binding precedent established by the Supreme Court
in Henkel.

In addition, the Roberts court failed to consider the language of
Rule 54(d) which limits the district court's discretion when an express
cost provision is made in a federal statute. 8 Since federal statutes
53. For a discussion of Henkel, see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text
supra.

54. See 651 F.2d at 206. For a discussion of Farmer, see notes 26-28 and
accompanying text supra.
55. See 651 F.2d at 206. For a discussion of Welsch, see notes 36 & 37
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reliance
on Welsch, see notes 42 9c 44 supra.
56. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that, in
contrast to the per diem allowance for witnesses, § 1821 does not set a maximum
dollar amount for travel expenses. See note 22 supra.
57. For the Farmer Court's language, see note 28 supra. The segment of
the Farmer Court's opinion which the Third Circuit quoted contains no reference to the specific area of witness fees and absolutely no mention of
expert fees. See 651 F.2d at 206. In the quoted portion, the Farmer Court
consistently employed the general term "costs" in its discussion of the appropriate expenses which may be taxed against the losing party. See id., quoting
379 U.S. at 235. The Farmer Court stated that "[w]e do not regard that Rule
[54(d)] as giving district judges unrestrained discretion to tax costs to reimburse a winning litigant for every expense." 379 U.S. at 235 (emphasis
added). Subsequently, the quoted material said that "the discretion given
district judges to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with reference to
expenses not specifically allowed by statute." Id. (emphasis added). In the

latter quotation, the Farmer Court conspicuously used the general language
"expenses

not specifically allowed by statute," rather than utilizing the narrower phraselogy of "expenses not specifically allowed by section 1821." See
651 F.2d at 206, quoting 379 U.S. at 235.
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). For the text of Rule 54(d), see note 8
supra. For a discussion of Rule 54(d), see notes 15 8c 17 and accompanying
text supra. The Third Circuit merely stated that "Farmer appears to hold
that Rule 54(d) authorizes district judges to exercise discretion-albeit 'sparing'-to award costs not specifically enumerated in § 1821" and that the Farmer
Court "based its interpretation of Rule 54(d) not on a Henkel-like theory of
statutory preclusion of costs not listed in § 1821, but on policy considerations
militating against award of unenumerated costs." 651 F.2d at 206 (footnote
omitted).
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specifically govern the taxing of witness fees as costs, 50 these statutes,
rather than Rule 54(d), are controlling in a determination of whether a
district court may award fees. 60 Section 1821 explicitly provides a per
diem allowance for witnesses and makes no provision regarding extra
compensation for expert witnesses.61 Therefore, the Roberts decision
cannot be reconciled with the language of Rule 54(d) which incorporates
by reference the maximum statutory allowance for witness fees in
section 1821.
Although it is at least arguable that the exception in Rule 54(d) for
express statutory provisions is not applicable since section 1821 does not
specifically mention expert witness fees, this approach is inconsistent
with the legislative history of section 1821. The Senate Report accompanying section 1821 indicates that the concept of allowing extra compensation was considered and rejected. 62 Thus, the Third Circuit's
decision to allow district courts the discretion to tax expert witness fees
as costs is clearly inconsistent with Congressional intent.
It is suggested that the Third Circuit's decision will discourage unsubstantiated suits and defenses and foster the filing of meritorious
actions. 3 Since prevailing parties will be allowed to recover expert witness
fees, the potential litigant will not be dissuaded from bringing a meri04
torious claim by his concern over the compensation of expert witnesses.
The Roberts decision to allow the award of expert fees should encourage
the production of expert testimony and lead to better-informed decisions
by fact-finders. 5 It is further suggested that Roberts will not result in the
59. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920(3) (1976). For a discussion of these statutes, see notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). The opening phrase of Rule 54(d) clearly
provides an exception to the district court's discretion to award costs. See id.
Rule 54(d) begins with the following language: "Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules,
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs." Id. (emphasis added).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821.

For the text of § 1821, see note 22 supra.

62. See S. REP. No. 187, supra note 25, at 1231-32. This legislative history is especially significant in light of the Henkel Court's language that Congressional intent controls when deciding whether a federal statute preempts the
district court's discretion to award costs. For a discussion of the Senate Report,
see note 25 supra. For a discussion of Henkel, see notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
63. See C.

WRIGHT,

supra note 13, § 2665, at 125.

64. Id. Professors Wright and Miller have specifically recognized this
reason for taxing fees as costs in stating that an award of costs "reduce[s] the
threat of liability for litigation expenses as an obstacle to the commencement
of a lawsuit or the assertion of a defense that might have some merit." Id.
65. See Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. at 596. The Welsch court noted that
the expert testimony added greatly to the court's knowledge of the subject
matter of the case. Id. For a discussion of Welsch, see notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
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indiscriminate awarding of expert fees to prevailing parties, since the
Third Circuit specifically denounced this practice and limited its holding to situations in which the expert testimony is necessary to the resolution of the issue.0 6 In addition, Roberts may have significant impact
as authority for the proposition that Farmer limits Henkel's restrictive
rule concerning taxability of expenses above the section 1821 allowance. 67
Robert J. Prettyman
66. For a
accompanying
67. For a
accompanying

discussion of the Roberts court's decision, see notes 38-46 and
text supra.
discussion of the Roberts court's reasoning, see note 43 and
text supra.
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